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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-3660
___________
CHRIS WASHINGTON-EL,
Appellant
v.

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Sued in his
individual and official capacity; GEORGE PATRICK; RANDALL BRITTON; DEPUTY
SUPT. CLOSE; F. HARNETT; BRIAN COLEMAN; DEPUTY SUPT. BURNS;
DEPUTY SUPT. GATES; MICHAEL ZAKEN; ERIC ARMEL; CAPTAIN LEGGETT;
SHERWOOD HUGHES; STEPHEN BUZAS; FRANK LEWIS,
in their individual capacities
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-01688)
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect and
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 13, 2014
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 20, 2014)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM

Chris Washington-El appeals pro se from an order of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, entering judgment in favor of the
defendants in his civil rights action. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
In December 2008, Washington-El filed a complaint, which he amended several
times, against numerous Department of Corrections (“DOC”) officials and employees.
His allegations can generally be divided into two categories: (1) due process claims
related to his initial placement and continued confinement in administrative custody, and
(2) constitutional challenges to the conditions of his confinement. The violations
allegedly occurred while Washington-El was incarcerated at SCI-Houtzdale (June 2007
through February 2008) and SCI-Fayette (February 2008 through November 2009).
Following a Magistrate Judge’s entry of Reports and Recommendations, the District
Court – in three separate orders – granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and their
motion for summary judgment. After the District Court denied Washington-El’s motion
for reconsideration, he appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 “We review district court
decisions regarding both summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim
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The District Court rejected Washington-El’s last remaining claims by final order and
judgment entered on March 28, 2013. Washington-El filed a timely motion for
reconsideration on April 10, 2013, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), thereby tolling the time for
filing an appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). The District Court denied
reconsideration on July 12, 2013. Washington-El submitted his notice of appeal to prison
officials for mailing 27 days later, on August 8, 2013. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A);
2

under the same de novo standard of review.” Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d
822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir.
2006). We review the District Court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration for abuse
of discretion. See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669,
673 (3d Cir. 1999).
On June 13, 2007, Washington-El was transferred from SCI-Graterford to SCIHoutzdale, where, for the majority of his eight-month incarceration there, he was held in
administrative custody.2 He was placed on the Restricted Release List (“RRL”) in

4(c)(1); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). Therefore, the notice of appeal was
timely as to both the denial of reconsideration and the order granting summary judgment.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Moreover, we now also have jurisdiction to review
the District Court’s prior orders granting in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss. See
Head v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Tr., 225 F.3d 794, 800 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that
ruling on motion to dismiss which did not dispose of all claims was rendered appealable
when District Court later entered summary judgment resolving all outstanding claims).
2

With respect to Washington-El’s claim that his initial placement in administrative
custody at SCI-Houtzdale violated his due process rights, the District Court properly held
that he lacked a protected interest in such placement. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S.
78, 88 n.9 (1976) (explaining that prisoners have no legitimate due process concerns in
3

January 2008, signifying that he could be released from administrative custody only upon
prior approval of the Secretary of Corrections. In February 2008, Washington-El was
transferred to SCI-Fayette, where his placement in administrative custody and inclusion
on the RRL continued. In total, Washington-El was in administrative custody and/or
included on the RRL during approximately 26 of the 28 months he was incarcerated in
SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette.
Washington-El alleged that his continued administrative custody and RRL
classifications violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Assuming that the circumstances of his incarceration are sufficient to
trigger procedural due process rights, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995),
Washington-El has failed to demonstrate that he was not afforded proper due process
protections. We have held that periodic review of inmates indefinitely confined to
administrative custody meets due process requirements. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140,
147 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, Washington-El was timely informed that he was placed in
administrative custody and included on the RRL because he was considered an escape
risk. In addition, his numerous challenges to his custody status, both formal and
informal, were regularly reviewed by members of the Program Review Committee
(“PRC”) at SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette. See id. at 144 (holding that a prisoner who

their prison classifications). We also note that a challenge to Washington-El’s placement
in administrative custody at SCI-Graterford, as well as other claims, is the subject of a
separate action filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See Washington-El v.
DiGuglielmo, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 06-cv-04517.
4

was placed in administrative custody for eight years was afforded all the process he was
due because “an ‘informal, nonadversary review’ at which the prisoner has the
opportunity to state his views, satisfies the requirements of due process” (quoting Hewitt
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983))). Moreover, the summary judgment record belies
Washington-El’s assertion that the periodic reviews were perfunctory, and thus
inadequate. See Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that
due process violation occurred where prison officials applied justifications for
segregation in “rote fashion”). During those reviews, prison officials considered the
status of an investigation concerning a possible escape plan involving Washington-El,
reviewed the results of that investigation, assessed whether to recommend Washington-El
for release to the general population, and responded to his arguments for release from
administrative custody. Finally, it is difficult to conclude that review was not meaningful
where, following Washington-El’s contention that the investigation was being
intentionally delayed, he was released from administrative custody for approximately two
months.
We also agree with the District Court that Washington-El failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to his remaining claims, all of which concern his
conditions of confinement, rather than his continued placement in administrative custody.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), inmates must exhaust their
administrative remedies before filing a suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional
conduct by prison officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A prisoner must exhaust these
5

remedies “in the literal sense”; no further avenues in the prison’s grievance process
should be available. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004). “[I]t is the
prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper
exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The DOC has an Inmate
Grievance System, which permits inmates to seek review of issues relating to their
confinement, see DC-ADM 804, and a separate policy regarding Administrative Custody
Procedures, which allows inmates to challenge initial and continued administrative
custody placement, see DC-ADM 802.
An affidavit prepared by the DOC custodian of inmate grievance records indicated
that, while confined at SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette, Washington-El appealed to final
review eight grievances brought under DC-ADM 804. After thoroughly reviewing the
record, we agree with the District Court that none of those grievances pertained to the
conditions of confinement claims that he raised in the this lawsuit. Washington-El
argued, however, that his remaining claims were administratively exhausted through
grievances that he filed pursuant to DC-ADM 802. Importantly, however, the regulatory
scheme that was in effect during the relevant time period provided that DC-ADM 802
governed challenges only to initial or continued confinement in administrative custody;
DC-ADM 804 remained applicable to challenges unrelated to custody status.3

3

DOC regulations provided “access to a formal procedure through which the resolution
of problems or other issues of concern arising during the course of confinement may be
sought.” DC-ADM 804 § V (2004). But this general provision was subject to an
exception which stated that “[i]nitial review of issues relating to the following
6

Washington-El also claimed that DOC officials advised him that he could not use DCADM 804 to grieve issues related to the conditions of his confinement in administrative
custody. But such advice allegedly occurred in January 2011, after Washington-El had
been transferred from SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette. Furthermore, while confined in
those facilities, Washington-El did use DC-ADM 804 to challenge conditions of his
administrative custody, other than those raised in his complaints.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that Washington-El failed to state a due
process claim concerning his continued confinement in administrative custody and failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his conditions of confinement claims. In
addition, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of the motion for
reconsideration, as Washington-El’s arguments did not serve “to correct manifest errors
of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779

Department policies shall be in accordance with procedures outlines therein[:] . . . DCADM 802, Administrative Custody Procedures.” DC-ADM 804 § IV, ¶ H. The
regulations pertaining to administrative custody, in turn, provided that “[a]n inmate may
appeal the decision of the PRC concerning his/her initial confinement in [administrative
custody] to the Facility Manager/designee” and thereafter “may appeal the . . . decision
. . . to continue him/her in [administrative custody] . . . to the Office of the Chief Hearing
Examiner.” DC-ADM 802 § 2, ¶¶ C.1 and C.2 (2008). In 2011, after the relevant time
period in this case, DC-ADM 802 was amended to provide that “[a]ll issues concerning
an inmate’s placement in [administrative] custody or the duration, conditions or other
circumstances of his/her [administrative custody] status must be addressed through the
procedures set for in this directive and may not be addressed through the procedures set
forth in DC-ADM 801 [pertaining to disciplinary proceedings] or DC-ADM 804.” DCADM 802 § 2, ¶ D.9 (emphasis added).
7

F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.4

4

Washington El’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel is denied.
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